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Abstract
The adoption of synchrophasor technology has
increased rapidly in the past decade. Many system
operators have made synchrophasor applications
available to operators, to reveal hidden operating
conditions, and increase grid resiliency. The
development of Linear State Estimation provided an
innovative method to solve system states linearly at a
faster rate, and serve as a backup to EMS should the
conventional State Estimator fail to solve. Advanced
applications were developed to take advantage of LSE
solution to provide operators with alternative
contingency
analysis
applications
using
synchrophasors data [6]. However, currently explored
applications are presumed to run iteratively every
couple of minutes, and therefore not taking advantage
of high resolution of measurements available in
synchrophasors. This work proposes a method to
monitor system limits by leveraging linearization
methods for contingency analysis, to better utilize the
benefits of synchrophasors. Also, a practical approach
is proposed to handle lack of full observability, to
ensure tool operability with the industry infrastructure.

1. Introduction
The increase in load demand and the limited
upgrades to transmission systems are pushing power
systems to operate closer to their reliability boundaries,
which may cause unforeseen operating conditions
leading to cascading outages, uncontrolled system
separation, or even blackouts. Therefore, the modern
operation of the power grid requires continuous
monitoring of System Operating Limits for normal and
outage conditions, to ensure the reliable and secure
operation of the system. Tools such as Real-Time
Contingency Analysis (RTCA) are becoming a critical
component of the modern power system operations
environment to provide operators with the outlook
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necessary to guarantee that the system is operated within
its pre-set boundaries should unforeseen outages
happen. Power systems are becoming heavily dependent
on advanced applications to reveal system conditions
that were once unobservable by operators. Energy
Management Systems (EMS) are equipped with
comprehensive applications nowadays to help operators
monitor the health of the grid, and even observe areas of
the system that are not metered. State Estimator (SE) is
an application within EMS that uses SCADA
measurements and an iterative non-linear engine to
provide downstream applications with a fully
observable error-free system snapshot, for system
monitoring and analysis. State Estimation is resource
intensive by nature given the necessity to solve an
optimization problem in an iterative fashion, which
requires substantial amount of time to solve. Real-time
network applications such as Real-Time Contingency
Analysis use State Estimator solved powerflow cases to
conduct iterative analysis to foresee system conditions
should unscheduled outages occur in the power system.
Real-Time Contingency Analysis usually handles
thousands of contingencies, which is also resource
intensive and time exhausting. In addition, typical
RTCA runs iteratively every 3-5 minutes, and provides
a list of potential violations for any possible
contingency. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)
enabled Linearization of the State Estimation problem,
leading to the development of Linear State Estimator
(LSE). LSE algorithms are presented in [1][4-10]. LSE
provides solution at synchrophasor rate, which allows
more visibility to the power grid as compared to
conventional State Estimation [1][4-5]. With access to
more system snapshots through Linear State Estimation,
synchrophasor measurements can be used to enhance
RTCA by filling in the gaps in the solutions using
SCADA-based applications. This work investigates
methods for using synchrophasor-based technology,
vetted by Linear State Estimator to provide higherresolution results for Security Analysis, to reveal not
only violations at multi-minute interval, but also
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dynamics of violations at synchrophasor rate. This work
addresses practical considerations regarding system
observability, which is driven by PMU deployments,
and proposes a solution to overcome limitations caused
by limited PMU coverage.

2. Use of Linear Shift Factors (LSFs)
Real-Time contingency analysis requires solving
iterative powerflow equations for thousands of system
topological scenarios to reveal potential exceedances to
System Operating Limits (SOLs) following
unscheduled loss of equipment in real-time. Multiple
approaches have been proposed to perform security
analysis using synchrophasor measurements [2].
However, these methods suggest a contingency analysis
that runs iteratively over a multi-minute window, like
SCADA-based
applications.
Although
such
applications might provide a backup solution to existing
contingency analysis applications should they fail in
real-time, they disregard the benefit of high-resolution
measurement availability in synchrophasor data.
Synchrophasors
offer
synchronized
phasor
measurements at rates of at least 30 samples per second
(for 60 Hz systems), which allow monitoring of system
dynamics and transients. Linear Shift Factors (LSF)
provide a linear estimation to the security analysis
problem, which allow much faster calculations as
compared to solving powerflow iteratively [12]. Shift
Factors are constants that can be used to estimate the
powerflow on a specific transmission equipment,
knowing the power on another. Two types of Linear
shift factors are well studied in literature [3][12]; Power
Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) and Line Outage
Distribution Factors (LODFs). Power Transfer
Distribution Factor is the change in power flow on a
transmission line relative to a power transfer between
two buses (injection and withdrawal of power at two
buses). [12]. PTDFs have the following mathematical
definition:
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
,
(1)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑙𝑙 =
𝛥𝛥 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
Where,
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑙𝑙 = Power Transfer Distribution Factor for
Line 𝑙𝑙, given an injection and withdrawal
at buses a and b respectively.

𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 = Change in Line 𝑙𝑙 power flow for the
transaction at buses a and b.
𝛥𝛥 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 = Power transferred in from bus a to bus b
Line Outage Distribution Factors are constants that
represent the estimated change of power on a
transmission line or a transformer relative to a loss of
another line [12]. Like PTDFs, LODF are defined as
follows:

Where,

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 =

𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙
,
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0

(2)

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 = Line Outage Distribution Factor for Line 𝑙𝑙,
after the contingency of Line 𝑐𝑐

𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 = Change in Line 𝑙𝑙 power flow following the
contingency of Line 𝑐𝑐

𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0 = Power flow of contingency element 𝑐𝑐 before it was
removed

3. Security Analysis Using Shift Factors
The objective of the proposed methodology is to
provide real-time operators and engineers with fast realtime security analysis that uses synchrophasor
measurements and Linear State Estimation results.
Synchrophasor measurements provide accurate and fast
measurements to voltage and current phasors, which can
be used to provide accurate contingency analysis results.
However, the relatively low number of synchrophasors
available from the grid makes it challenging to observe
the real-time state of the whole system, even when
violations are localized to a relatively small electrical
area. The deployment of PMUs has been focused on key
substations of the transmission grid, such as heavily
interconnected substations, or stations with intertie
lines, without much deployment in locations to
optimally target full system observability. In addition,
with synchrophasors focusing on wide area monitoring
and situational awareness, the deployment of PMUs has
been spread out in the transmission systems. This paper
describes a practical method to use Linear Shift Factors
with a limited available PMU coverage in the system, to
estimate and monitor System Operating Limits
exceedances at the synchrophasor rate. Figure 1 below
represents a generic 5-bus power system, which will be
used to explain the methodology proposed in this paper.

Figure 1. Generic 5-Bus Power System
Table 1 below shows the line loading information
for all transmission lines in the case. For this example,
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we will attempt to estimate the post-contingency line
flows for all lines, following the loss of line 2-3. PTDFs
for all lines relative to the injection/withdrawal of power
at buses 2 and 4 respectively are also shown. Buses 2
and 4 represent the main source and sink of the system,
which in result will derive the highest PTDFs set for all
major lines. Also, LODFs for all lines are provided for
the contingency of line 2-3.
Table 1. MW, PTDFs for transaction between buses
2 and 4, and LODFs of the outage of line 2-3
𝑙𝑙

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

1-2

𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙

79

% 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2,4,𝑙𝑙
-17.14%

%𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,2−3
-33.3%

𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,2−3

1-3

62.14

17.14%

33.3%

80.98

2-3

57.16

28.57%

-100%

0

2-4

52.35

36.19%

44.4%

77.31

2-5

111.27

18.10%

22.2%

123.65

3-4

-27.7

45.71%

-66.7%

-66.02

4-5

16.13

18.10%

-22.2%

3.35

60.02

With all the powerflow information readily
available, we can use LODFs to estimate the postcontingency flow on Line 𝑙𝑙 following the loss of
transmission line 𝑘𝑘 using the below equation [12] :
(3)
𝑓𝑓̂𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 = 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙0 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0
Where, 𝑓𝑓̂𝑙𝑙 is the power flow on Line 𝑙𝑙 after the removal
of Line 𝑐𝑐
Estimations of the post-contingency line flows for
the loss of Line 2-3 are presented in table 1 as well.
Figure 2 presents the actual MW flow of the line
following the contingency. The results agree with the
estimated results as expected.

Figure 2. Simulation of the loss of Line 2-3 on the 5bus generic case in Figure 1
For real-time applications implementation,
equation (3) can be fed with real-time measurements
continuously to update the post-contingency flow at the
synchrophasor rate, and provide an updated outlook to

system operators on the monitored SOL, without the
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
and
need to continuously solve full powerflow. 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐
represent the real-time measurement of the
limiting element (monitored element) and the
contingency element prior to the loss of the line
respectively. Therefore, the linear equation above can
be used to estimate the post-contingency line flow for
any transmission line, given the flow-measurement
availability of the limiting and contingency elements.
To apply that, equation (3) becomes,
= 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 0
(4)
𝑓𝑓̂𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤

Where 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 denotes to the updated measurement for the
line flow, as compared to the original flow from the
solved powerflow.
The challenge of making use of LODFs with
synchrophasor measurements resides in the lack of
availability of PMUs at every substation of the system
to provide full observability, that is necessary to solve
the linear equations. This means that 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙0 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 and 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
in equation (4) (the updated limiting and contingency
elements flow measurements) might not be always
available. Therefore, a practical methodology needs to
be implemented to provide awareness for all
contingencies and limiting elements, given the lack of
measurement availability.
It is assumed that measurements at much lower
rates are available from EMS or State Estimator cases
through conventional methods. Since most State
Estimators run at a rate of at least once every 5 minutes,
a value for unobservable PMU locations is available as
a reference, which is used as a reference flow, and
updated using synchrophasor measurements. And since
this value is used as a reference and gets updated with
new measurements, it is referred to as 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 .
Let us define a new sensitivity factor called Line Flow
Distribution Factor (LFDF), that is derived from two
lines PTDFs as the following,
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑙𝑙
,
(4)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 =
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑘𝑘
Substituting (1) into (4) gives,
𝛥𝛥 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 =
,
(5)
𝛥𝛥 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
From this equation, it can be observed that the
relationship between the change of flow on two lines is
constant and does not depend on the power injected in
the power transfer transaction. Therefore, if line 𝑙𝑙 is not
observed, we can use equation 5 to estimate the change
in flow on Line 𝑙𝑙 using another observed Line 𝑘𝑘.
Rewriting equation (5), and dropping the transaction
index, we get,
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 = 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 ,
Or,

(5)
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�𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 � = 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 ,

Rearranging,

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 ,

(6)

(7)

updated
Similarly,
assuming
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (the
contingency element power flow before the
contingency) is not observable, it can be written in terms
of another line flow 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 which is observable. Applying
equation (7) to equation (4), we get,
= 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0 + 𝛥𝛥𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘0  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 +
𝑓𝑓̂𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

+ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐  �𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 0𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝛥𝛥𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗0  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗 �

(8)

Equation (8) allows the estimation of post
contingency loading on line 𝑙𝑙 for the contingency of
Line 𝑐𝑐, without the necessity of having updated
measurements from Lines 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑐𝑐. This provides system
operators with awareness of the system conditions for
parts of the system that in not otherwise observable.
This method is also applicable to reactive-power
calculations, although the focus here is on real power
since most line overloads in power systems are caused
by high real power flow. Pre-calculating LFDFs allows
a very fast procedure to scan the system for possible
violations for all possible contingencies. In addition, the
linear nature of the equations enables performing the
calculations at synchrophasor rate. Furthermore, the key
system assumptions are:
(1) The system model and enough telemetry are
available to calculate the sensitivity factors. Once the
factors are calculated, they are assumed to be valid and
correct as long as the system did not go through a major
change that affects these factors, such as a significant
topology change or a major generation profile change.
This assumption is valid given that those changes are
monitored and flagged in real-time to trigger the recalculation of all sensitivity factors.
(2) This method applies to single and multiple
contingencies,
given
that
specific
multiple
contingencies are pre-defined, and the corresponding
sensitivity factors for the multiple contingencies are precalculated. Therefore, a separate set of sensitivity
factors are required for multiple outages scenarios. This
assumption is also valid since system operators are
interested in monitoring only credible multiple
contingencies, such as lines sharing transmission
towers, right of ways, or critical transmission paths.
(3) The sensitivity factors are calculated with an
injection of power relatively far from the reference bus,
to ensure the accuracy of the calculated factors, without
the slack bus contributing to reverse the flow. An
example of apply this method is presented in the
following part of this section.
Let us consider a modified 5-bus system case,

where only measurements at buses 1 and 4 are available.
Also, loads were modified little to simulate a change
over time in lines loading. Updated case information is
presented in table 2 below.
Table 2. Updated MW flow with Lines only
connected to substations 1 and 4
Line l

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙

52.35 MW

53.67 MW

1.32 MW

16.13 MW

17.20 MW

1.07 MW

2-3

57.16 MW

2-5

111.27 MW

2-4
4-5

Unobservable Contingency

Unobservable Limiting
Element

In order to estimate the post-contingency flow on
Line 2-5 for the contingency of Line 2-3 for example,
the equation becomes,
= 𝑓𝑓2−5 0 + 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓4−5  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2−5,4−5 +
𝑓𝑓̂2−5,2−3
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

+ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2−5,2−3 �𝑓𝑓2−3 0𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 +
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓2−4  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2−3,2−4 � (9)

This provides a post contingency estimation of
128.61 MW for the limiting element 2-5, for the loss of
the line 2-3. The result can be compared with the
powerflow simulation result shown below in Figure 3.
The resulting error in estimation is 0.4%.

Figure 3. Simulation of the loss of Line 2-3 on the
updated 5-bus generic case in Figure 1

4. Case Study and Simulations
A case study is presented in this section to evaluate
and demonstrate the numerical accuracy of the
proposed methodology. The case uses the IEEE 39 bus
system, which is reduced from New-England’s power
system model. This case study illustrates the
methodology to perform linear security analysis using
synchrophasor measurements by taking advantage of
distribution factors to estimate the post contingency
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flow on transmission equipment where observability is
not present. To demonstrate the numerical viability of
this approach, the results are compared to the
powerflow simulations using PowerWorld Simulator.

4.1. IEEE 39-Bus System
The IEEE 39 bus test system is a 10-machine test
system model that is reduced from New-England Power
System that has 10 generators and 46 lines [16][17]. A
one line presentation of the power system model is
shown in Figure 4 below. PMU observable transmission
lines and buses are shown in red. Table 3 below shows the
line loading information for some transmission lines in
the case, as an example, we will attempt to estimate the
post-contingency line flows for all lines, following the
loss of line 2-3.

17-27
26-27

-11.51 MW

270.44 MW

24.22%
24.22%

In order to demonstrate the numerical viability of
the proposed method, we will attempt to calculate the
post contingency flow of multiple transmission lines,
following the loss of the line 2-25. As an example, to
calculate the post-contingency flow on line 3-18, from
equation (3) we get,
0
0
+ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3−18,2−25  𝑓𝑓2−25
(10)
𝑓𝑓̂3−18,2−25 = 𝑓𝑓3−18
With a LODF of 73.6%, the estimated postcontingency line flow of line 3-18 for the contingency
of line 2-25 is equal to 204.08 MW. This is verified by
simulation as shown in Figure 5, with an error in
estimation of 0.6%.

Figure 5. Post-Contingency flow of line 3-18 for the
loss of line 2-25

Figure 4. IEEE 39-Bus System with Limited PMU
Observability
PTDFs for all lines relative to the
injection/withdrawal of power at buses 25 and 9
respectively are also shown in table 3. Similar to the
previous exercise, buses 25 and 6 represent the main
source and sink of the meshed transmission system,
which in result will derive the highest PTDFs set for all
major lines.
Table 3. MW, PTDFs for transaction on buses 25
and 6
Line 𝑙𝑙
2-3

2-25
3-18

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙

364.72 MW
231.50 MW
34.09 MW

% 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃25,6,𝑙𝑙

Since both lines are not observable by PMUs, the
change in pre-contingency line flow with time cannot
be calculated as the updated flow is not known for
both lines, due to lack of PMU observability. Using
equation (8), we can rewrite equation (10) using other
observable lines k and j, in which equation (10)
becomes as follows,
̂
= 𝑓𝑓3−18 0 + 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3−18,𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓3−18,2−25
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

+ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3−18,2−25  �𝑓𝑓2−25,𝑗𝑗 0𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
+ 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2−25,𝑗𝑗 �

(11)

Let us assume that the system state changed a little,
and the updated flows for the observable lines from table
3 are shown in table 4. Similar to the previous exercise,
loads were modified slightly to simulate a change over
time in lines loading.

55.73%
75.78%
2.97%
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Table 4. Updated MW flow with Lines only
connected to substations 1 and 4
Line l

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

2-3

364.72 MW

3-18

34.09 MW

2-25
17-27

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

378.4 MW

𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙

13.68 MW

Unobservable Contingency

231.50 MW

Unobservable Limiting
Element
4.97 MW

-11.51

16.48 MW

From Figure 4, selecting line 17-27 as line k, and
line 2-3 as line j, and substituting in equation (11) we
get,
= 𝑓𝑓3−18 0 +
𝑓𝑓̂3−18,2−25
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓17−27  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3−18,17−27 +
+ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3−18,2−25 �𝑓𝑓2−25 0𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 +
(12)
+ 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓2−3  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2−25,2−3 �
Equation (12) calculates the Post Contingency
Line flow of Line 3-18 for the loss of line 2-25 to be
218.29 MW. Verification using powerflow
simulations has been performed and provides a postcontingency flow of 216.83 MW, with a tolerance of
0.67%, as shown in Figure 6.

observable lines, and other simulation information
where,
Line l – Transmission Line
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 – Base-case pre-contingency flows
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 – Updated base case pre-contingency flows
LODF – Line Outage Distribution Factor
𝑓𝑓̂𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (Estimate) – Estimated post-contingency flows
𝑓𝑓̂𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (Powerflow) – Actual post-contingency flows
% Error – Percentage errors in estimation
Table 5. Estimation and accuracy of PostContingency line flows for the loss of Line 2-25 with
limited observability
Line l
2-3

2-25
3-18

17-18
17-27
25-26
26-27

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

(MW)

364.72
231.50
34.09
192.32
-11.51
78.61
270.44

𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(MW)
378.4
4.97

LODF %

88
-100
73.6
73.6
100
100
100

𝑓𝑓̂𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(Estimate)

158.31
0
218.29
376.52
239.59
329.71
521.54

𝑓𝑓̂

𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
(Powerflow)

158.04
0
216.83
376.30
245.37
342.22
530.75

% 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸

0.17
0
0.67
0.58
2.36
3.66
1.74

With such small system models, the tolerance
typically is contributed to by the swing bus or the
boundary buses as the external system is modeled with
equivalent generators at the boundaries and the slack is
picked up at the boundaries and at the swing bus. It is
also noticeable that error percentage increases the
further away the limiting element or the contingency
element are from the observable branch that is used for
the calculation. Therefore, more PMU deployments
means increased accuracy of the estimations for
contingency analysis results.

5. Conclusions

Figure 6. Post-Contingency flow of line 3-18 for the
loss of line 2-25
Table 5 presents the Estimation of post
contingency line flow for the major lines relatively
close to the observable lines, and demonstrates the
accuracy of the proposed approach. All the
estimations are accurate with acceptable tolerances.
It is worth mentioning that using this approach, a
security analysis was performed only using a basecase and two PMUs, to monitor System Operating
Limits, even for unobservable footprint. Table 5
shows the transmission lines surrounding the PMU

This paper proposes a methodology to perform
security analysis using synchrophasor measurements
and Linear State Estimation technology with limited
observability on the power grid. This method increases
the situational awareness of the system, to extend
beyond the observable footprint of the grid, while
maintaining a solution at the synchrophasor rate to
provide visibility of system dynamics. The method
produces accurate estimations representing the power
grid following the loss of transmission lines and
transformers, with a linear solution that solves as fast as
PMU measurement rate. The accuracy of results
depends on the validity of the sensitivity factors.
Therefore, monitoring the system for changes affecting
the factors to trigger re-calculation of LFDFs is crucial
to guarantee accurate estimations. This applies to both
single and multiple contingency definitions. It is also
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imperative to ensure that the reference bus, in the case
used to calculate the sensitivity factors, is relatively far
from the power injection, to ensure accurate calculations
of these factors. The accuracy of results also depend on
the PMU coverage of the system. Increase in PMU
adoption allowing additional measurements across the
system and leveraging Linear State Estimation to
provide accurate data and expanded visibility to the
security analysis, will provide higher accuracy of
estimations.
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